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LANDS OF OPPORTUNITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS 
AND IMPACT OF OPPORTUNITY ZONES IN THE TAX CUTS AND JOBS 
ACT OF 2017 
 
Joseph Bennett† 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 On December 22, 2017, President Donald Trump signed the sweeping Tax Cuts 
and Jobs Act into law.1  By drastically altering many portions of the existing tax 
landscape, this bill marked the largest overhaul of the federal income tax since 1986.2  
In addition to the breadth of modifications to existing provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code (“Code”) in Title 26, the bill contributes a number of new instances 
of tax expenditures as well.3  Amid the fervor surrounding highly debated portions 
the new legislation,4 one of the new policies that seemed to get lost in the fray initially 
was the creation of Opportunity Zones.5  
 At their most basic level, Opportunity Zones encourage investors to move 
                                                          
†J.D. Candidate 2020 Notre Dame Law School; B.A., University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 2015.  
I would like to thank the Editorial Staff at the Notre Dame Journal of Legislation for their assistance and dili-
gence.  Most importantly, I would also like to thank my mom for her support throughout this process and my 
life as a whole. 
1   Christina Wilke, Trump Signs GOP Tax Plan and Short-term Government Funding Bill on His Way 
Out of Town, CNBC (Dec. 22, 2017, 10:50 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/22/trump-signs-gop-tax-plan-
short-term-government-funding-bill.html.  
2   Everything You Need to Know About the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, TAX FOUND., https://taxfounda-
tion.org/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-explained/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2019). 
3   See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017).  
4   See, e.g., Alan S. Blinder, Almost Everything is Wrong With the New Tax Law, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 
2017, 6:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/almost-everything-is-wrong-with-the-new-tax-law-
1514416503; Lauren Hirsch, GOP Tax Bill Includes a Provision that Could Enrich Trump and Republican 
Senators, CNBC (Dec. 17, 2017, 1:37 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/12/17/sen-john-cornyn-defends-tax-
provision-that-could-benefit-trump.html; John Sides, Here's the Incredibly Unpopular GOP Tax Reform Plan 
— in One Graph, WASH. POST (Nov. 18, 2017),  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2017/11/18/heres-the-incredibly-unpopular-gop-tax-reform-plan-in-one-
graph/?utm_term=.e45d86e8dbd0.  
5   26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018); 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2 (2018).  Since the start of research and preparation 
of this Note, there has been a dramatic increase of interest in the topic.  As more investors and developers have 
begun taking advantage of the new provision, the legal community has responded in order to try to provide 
some guidance in the new frontier.  See, e.g., Alexandre M. Denault, New Qualified Opportunity Zone Guidance 
Released, ACKERMAN (Oct. 24, 2018), https://www.akerman.com/en/perspectives/new-qualified-opportunity-
zone-guidance-released.html; Nickolas Gianou & David F. Levy, Opportunity Zone Funds Update, SKADDEN, 
ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM (Nov. 27, 2018), https://www.skadden.com/insights/events/2018/11/oppor-
tunity-zone-funds-update; Bill A. Levy et al., New Proposed Tax Rules Favorable for Opportunity Funds, KIRK-
LAND & ELLIS (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.kirkland.com/publications/newsletter/2018/10/pifo-opportunity-
funds.  
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capital they have earned from other investments towards low-income communities.6  
They provide large tax breaks to those that take advantage of the program—the longer 
the investment is held by the investor, the greater the tax break.7  The provision is 
purported to benefit low-income communities proportionally to the investors’ gain.8  
However, this provision is unlikely to benefit the United States as a whole.  Rather, 
Opportunity Zones will: (1) cause the United States to lose significant revenues; (2) 
cause harm to low-income communities; (3) disproportionately enrich America’s 
wealthiest citizens; and (4) face—and continue to face—bureaucratic and 
interpretational problems with its implementation. 
 Part I of this Note will discuss the Opportunity Zone program as laid out in § 
1400Z in greater detail and compare the new section to the history and purposes of 
the United States Federal Income Tax.  In Part II, this Note will examine past federal 
low-income redevelopment projects and what it means to be a “Qualified 
Opportunity Zone” under § 1400Z-1.  Part III will argue that due to the limited access 
to the program for investors and the great benefit to those who are able to take 
advantage of the provision, there will be a large national inequity created by 
Opportunity Zones.  Part IV will discuss the present implementation problems that 
approach dangerous levels of vagueness that need significant clarification and further 
regulation if the Opportunity Zone program is going to succeed.  Finally, Part V will 
conclude this Note by discussing the current, practical reality of § 1400Z.  
 
I.OPPORTUNITY ZONES AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 
 
Article I of the United States Constitution grants Congress the “[p]ower [t]o lay 
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises to pay the Debts and provide for the 
common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”9  Although the power 
to tax is clearly enumerated in the Constitution, whether that power could be used to 
tax the income of citizens directly was not quite as clear when the original document 
was drafted.10  The first substantive attempt at federal income tax legislation came in 
1861, as the government was struggling to pay for the efforts of the ongoing Civil 
War.11  Unlike subsequent efforts to enact or amend federal income tax provisions, 
this pioneering statute was a mere three hundred words,12 but, like many of its 
ancestors, it did not survive long.13  It was wholly repealed and replaced less than one 
                                                          
6  See Benjamin W. Kennedy, The Opportunity Zone Program, 26 NEV. LAW. 19, 19 (2018) (discussing 
Opportunity Zones generally). 
7  Id. 
8  Jonathan Curry, Opportunity Zones Promising, but Must Overcome Lackluster Past, TAX NOTES, Feb. 
15, 2018, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/tax-preference-items-and-incentives/opportunity-zones-
promising-must-overcome-lackluster-past/2018/02/15/26wqf?highlight=opportunity%20zones.  
9  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
10  See, e.g., Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 582 (1895) (“Nothing can be clearer 
than that what the Constitution intended to guard against was the exercise by the general government of the 
power of directly taxing persons and property within any State through a majority made up from the other 
States.”). 
11  J. S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS: 1938–1861 vii 
(2d ed. 1953). 
12  Pub. L. No. 37-45, § 49, 12 Stat. 292, 309 (1861).   
13  See generally SEIDMAN, supra note 11. 
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year later.14  The concept of a federal income tax was dealt a another significant blow 
in 1895, when the Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co. held that 
taxing many kinds of income, including rental income and income from bonds, was 
unconstitutional as a direct tax.15  This decision made the formation of income tax as 
a whole impractical for the time being.16  But the idea of a federal income tax was 
not wholly ruled out, and in 1913, Congress acted to ratify the Sixteenth Amendment 
to explicitly give Congress the “power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and 
without regard to any census or enumeration.”17  Thus, the modern concept of a 
federal income tax was born.  
Since 1916, a number of legislative additions were made to the federal income 
tax in Title 26 of the United States Code.18  Significantly, the Supreme Court in 
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co. ruled that “income” included “gains or profits 
and income derived from any source whatever.”19  With this clarification, gross 
income—and therefore what was subject to the federal income tax—included any 
wages earned, compensation for property, dividends, rent, or generally transactions 
of any business.20  From there, the Internal Revenue Code can—and does—exempt 
some of this income in the general sense from income subject to federal taxation.21  
Although some of the touted “tax cuts” are really reductions in the actual rates of 
taxation, many “tax cuts” are instead exclusions in what is considered taxable 
income.22 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 is no different.  Although the taxation rate 
for the highest income tax bracket was temporarily reduced from 39.6% to 37%, 
many of the “tax cuts” for which it is named involve federal tax expenditure programs 
and reduction in what is considered income subject to federal taxation.23  One such 
expenditure program is the introduction of Opportunity Zones.24  
The Opportunity Zone program was designed to “encourage long-term private 
capital investment in economically distressed communities.”25  There are a number 
of guidelines that must be followed in order for an investment to be eligible for the 
program.26  First, the federal government grants the power of designating tracts of 
                                                          
14  See id. at 1036. 
15  Pollock, 157 U.S. 429 (1895).  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4 states that “[n]o capitation, or other direct, 
[t]ax shall be laid, unless in [p]roportion to the [c]ensus or [e]numeration herein before directed to be taken.” 
16  JAMES L. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: CASES AND MATERI-
ALS 14 (Saul Levmore et al. eds., 19th ed. 2018). 
17  U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
18  See generally SEIDMAN, supra note 11 (outlining changes to the Tax Code and the legislative intent 
behind the changes up to 1938); J. S. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME AND 
EXCESS PROFITS TAX LAWS: 1953-1939 (1954) (outlining Tax Code changes from 1939-1953).  
19  Comm’r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 429 (1955). 
20  Id. 
21  FREELAND ET AL., supra note 16, at 65.  
22  Id. 
23  I.R.C. § 1 (2018).  Note that although tax rates for individuals were not significantly reduced, the rates 
for corporations were reduced from 35% to a flat 21%.  I.R.C. § 11 (2018). 
24  I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018); I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2018). 
25  Kennedy, supra note 6, at 19. 
26  See §§ 1400Z-1; 1400Z-2. 
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land in certain low-income communities as “Qualified Opportunity Zones” in each 
state to the governor or other chief executive of that state.27  However, the governor 
may not designate more than 25% of tracts of land in low-income communities as 
Qualified Opportunity Zones.28  
Once the tracts of land have been designated by the governor, the onus is on the 
potential investors to act.  In order to be eligible, an inclined investor must establish 
a legal entity as a Qualified Opportunity Fund (“Fund”).29  A Fund must be organized 
as either a corporation or a partnership, and at least 90% of its assets must be 
Qualified Opportunity Zone property.30  No individual can invest directly into a 
Qualified Opportunity Zone.31  In order for a Fund to be eligible for the benefits, the 
money must either create a new use for the property (i.e., tear down blighted building 
and build new multi-use facility), or “substantially improve[]” the property.32  In 
order to qualify as “substantially improved,” a Fund must spend, on improvements 
alone, an amount greater than the cost basis of the property.33  
Those who opt into the program—and the communities they invest in—receive 
substantial benefits.  First, in a manner similar to a § 1031 Exchange,34 investors are 
allowed to defer payment of taxes on any capital gains used for the purchase of 
property in a Qualified Opportunity Zone until 2026 or the time the property is sold, 
whichever is sooner.  In doing so, investors are allowed to utilize capital that would 
have otherwise been needed for taxes.35  However, unlike a § 1031 Exchange, the 
property sold in the initial transaction does not have to be like-kind: a Fund can sell 
shares of stock, bonds, or any other property and place the funds into a Qualified 
Opportunity Zone.36  Next, a Fund’s long-term investment in a Qualified Opportunity 
Zone also allows for stepped-up cost basis in the Qualified Opportunity Zone 
property.37  If a Fund holds the property for five years, then it can report its basis in 
the property as 10% higher than it was when it was purchased, thereby saving that 
amount on future capital gains tax in any eventual sale of the property.38  If the Fund 
holds the property for seven years, then the basis is stepped-up an additional 5% to 
15%.39  Finally, if the Fund holds the property in the Qualified Opportunity Zone for 
ten years or longer, the basis is fully stepped-up to the value for which the property 
is eventually sold, effectively eliminating all tax on any capital gains in the property 
regardless of when, after the ten-year mark, the property is subsequently sold.40 
                                                          
27  § 1400Z-1. 
28  Id. 
29  § 1400Z-2. 
30  Id. 
31  Id. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  I.R.C. § 1031 (2018).  (allowing a seller of real property to postpone the recognition of any capital 
gain if the proceeds from the sale are used for the purchase of some other “like-kind” piece of real property).. 
35  § 1400Z-2. 
36  Id.  
37  Id. 
38  Id.  
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
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At its core, the purpose of a federal income tax is a revenue raising device.41  
Ideally, this goal should be attained while maintaining, wherever possible, “equity; 
economic efficiency; and a combination of simplicity, transparency, and 
administrability.”42  Unfortunately, in the case of Opportunity Zones, there is little 
evidence to show that these factors were carefully considered.  In fact, the provision 
was not in the original plan for the bill and was only added in the Senate before the 
bill was hurriedly pushed through for final approval.43   
The concepts of equity, simplicity, transparency, and administrability as related 
to Opportunity Zones will be discussed later in this Note.  
In regard to economic efficiency, however, this program oversteps its objective 
as a tax provision.  Economic efficiency issues in the Internal Revenue Code “result 
from taxes changing the economic decisions that people make—decisions such as 
how much to work, how much to save, what to consume, and where to invest.  These 
changes . . . reduce people’s well-being in a variety of ways that can include a loss 
of output or consumption opportunities.”44  In short, tax legislation should avoid 
economic efficiency costs influencing the way potential taxpayers act.45  Programs 
that have high economic efficiency costs can go as far as influencing whether or not 
taxpayers decide to get married, whether they will act in the market at all, or instead 
hold onto their money and remove potential action from commerce.46  The 
Opportunity Zone program, at its base, will “change the economic decisions that 
people make.”47  The large tax benefits will significantly encourage taxpayers to 
invest in locations covered by the program over those that are not.  The desired 
consequences of this influence for the targeted communities will be discussed in Part 
II of this Note, but at a more philosophical level, this program will influence the 
economies of the States as a whole.  When the federal government steps in and 
designates areas for tax benefits, it takes potential investment away from other 
potential investment locations.  Opportunity Zones do not encourage investment as a 
whole; they encourage investment in certain designated areas over those which are 
not.  This external influence disrupts a free market and prevents economic growth 
from occurring naturally.48 
In addition, the Opportunity Zone program is expected to be a large expenditure 
in the Internal Revenue Code.  According to Congress’s own conservative estimates 
in their budget report on the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, the Opportunity Zone program 
will result in a revenue loss for the federal government of an average of $1.6 billion 
                                                          
41  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-1009SP, UNDERSTANDING THE TAX REFORM DE-
BATE: BACKGROUND, CRITERIA, AND QUESTIONS, 1 (2005). 
42  Id. at 24.  
43  See JOINT COMM. TAXATION, JCX-65-17, COMPARISON OF THE REVENUE PROVISION CONTAINED IN 
H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT,” AS PASSED BY THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND AS AMENDED 
BY THE SENATE, 8 (2017). 
44  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-1009SP, supra note 41, at 35.. 
45  See id. 
46  See id. 
47  Id. 
48  Id. (“From a national perspective tax revenue is not a cost.  Tax revenue is not lost to the nation—it is 
moved from taxpayers’ pockets to the Treasury in order to pay for the programs and services that the govern-
ment provides . . . [E]fficiency costs . . . can result in forgone production and consumption opportunities.”). 
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per year for the next eight years.49  In fact, “[t]he revenue loss from the program 
might be greater than the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated because the 
incentives for investments are more generous than those for investments under 
previous programs.”50  With the federal deficit already above $20 trillion,51 and the 
rest of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act projected by Congress’s own conservative estimates 
to cost the government an average of $180 billion per year over that same eight-year 
stretch,52 the source of revenue to fund this program is unclear.  As a result, § 1400Z’s 
presence as part of the Internal Revenue Code is not easily reconciled with the 
purposes and goals of the federal income tax as a whole. 
 
I. IMPACT OF REDEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS ON COMMUNITIES 
 
Regardless of economic efficiency concerns, one of the legislative goals of the 
Opportunity Zone program is to “encourage long-term private capital investment in 
economically distressed communities.”53  
The process begins with a designation of Qualified Opportunity Zones.54  The 
areas eligible for this designation are limited to those defined as a “low-income 
community.”55  A “low-income community” is a population census tract where the 
poverty rate of the tract is 20%, or the median family income for the tract is 80% or 
less of either the median family income of the given metropolitan area or the median 
family income of the state as a whole.56  The governor or chief executive of a given 
state may designate 25% of these low-income communities as “Qualified 
Opportunity Zones” ripe for an investment from a potential investor.57 
This current iteration of Opportunity Zones is far from the first attempt at 
creating a tax incentive for investors to place funds into economically distressed 
areas.58  One early iteration was proposed by Richard Nixon during his 1968 
presidential campaign, and gained support of his then opponent, Robert Kennedy, as 
                                                          
49  JOINT COMM. TAXATION, JCX-67-17, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREE-
MENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT”, 6 (2018).  This tax expenditure estimate does not reach out 
far enough to encompass the full step up in cost basis for property held for ten years.  As long as the Opportunity 
Zone program is taken advantage of to its full extent, it should be the most significant loss of revenue surround-
ing the Opportunity Zone portion of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act.  The costs to the federal government due to this 
step up will begin in the year 2029 and could potentially continue for decades afterward as well. 
50 Zoe Sagalow, Opportunity Zones Could Benefit Investors More Than Communities, TAX NOTES, Aug. 
6, 2018, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/opportunity-zones-could-benefit-in-
vestors-more-communities/2018/08/06/289zk.  
51 Michael Collins, The National Debt and the Federal Deficit are Skyrocketing. How it Affects You, USA 
TODAY (Oct. 16, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/10/16/government-
spending-how-rising-federal-debt-deficit-impact-americans/1589889002/ (“The national debt is $21 trillion and 
counting.”).  
52 See JOINT COMM. TAXATION, JCX-67-17, supra note 49. 
53 Kennedy, supra note 6. 
54 I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018). 
55 Id.  
56 I.R.C. § 45D (2018). In 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-1(c)(1), “low-income community” is described as having 
the same definition as in 26 U.S.C. § 45D(e). 
57 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018). 
58 See Curry, supra note 8. 
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well.59  Neither this, nor any similar proposal, ended up being enacted during his 
Presidency, yet the ideas and reasoning presented by the candidates mirrored those 
of many similar programs that followed: 
Tax incentives—whether direct credits, accelerated depreciation or a 
combination of the two—should be provided to those businesses that 
locate branch offices or new plants in poverty areas, whether in the core 
cities or in rural America . . .  We need seed capital and seed effort in the 
ghetto.  We need a self-perpetuating program which does not rest on barren 
subsidies which when removed merely return the ghettos of America to 
their original state.  It will be important to devise tax credit programs so 
that each dollar of credit will have a maximum impact.  Once private 
enterprise begins to develop in the ghetto, it will become cumulative and 
self-perpetuating.  The economic iron curtains which now encompass the 
ghettos of this country will be dismantled and the people living there will 
gradually phase into the mainstream of American economic life.60 
Past programs, both from the federal and state level, have gone by names such as 
“Empowerment Zones,”61 “Renewal Communities,”62 “Enterprise Communities,”63 
and “Enterprise Zones.”64  Implementation in the communities at large has been 
limited, and where they have been implemented, studies found “modest effects 
overall with relatively high costs.”65  Where positive change has occurred, analysis 
                                                          
59 Robert B. Semple, Jr., Nixon Gives Plan for Aiding Slums, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 1968), at 26.  
60  Bruce Bartlett, Enterprise Zones: The Good, The Bad, and The Muddled, TAX NOTES, Jan. 21, 2014, 
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/incentives/enterprise-zones-good-bad-and-mud-
dled/2014/01/21/fb98 (quoting 1968 Nixon Campaign Document). 
61  See generally Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography of Economic Develop-
ment, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295 (1999).  Empowerment Zones as mentioned here were created in 1993 as part 
of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66 (1993).  In contrast to Opportunity 
Zones, they were designed for inner-city use only. 
62  See generally Kara Lamb, Revitalization from the Inside Out: The Attempts to Move Towards an Urban 
Renaissance in the Cities of the United States and the United Kingdom, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 159 (2003).  This 
version of Renewal Communities was established in the Community Renewal Tax Relief Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No. 106-554 (2000).  There were eighty Renewal Communities created in the programs first three years. 
63  See generally Wilton Hyman, Empowerment Zones, Enterprise Communities, Black Business, and 
Unemployment, 53 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 143 (1998).  These Enterprise Communities were estab-
lished alongside Empowerment Zones in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66 
(1993).  In 1998, there were ninety-five across the country. 
64  See generally Ellen P. Aprill, Caution: Enterprise Zones, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1341 (1993).  This itera-
tion of Enterprise Zones was introduced by President George H. W. Bush in response to unrest in Los Angeles 
during the early 1990s.  They entertained bipartisan support in Congress, but the provision was ultimately pocket 
vetoed by President Bush. 
65  JOINT COMM. TAXATION, JCX-38-09, INCENTIVES FOR DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES: EMPOWERMENT 
ZONES AND RENEWAL COMMUNITIES, 22, (2009).  See also Deirdre Oakley & Hui-Shien Tsao, A New Way of 
Revitalizing Distressed Urban Communities? Assessing the Impact of the Federal Empowerment Zone Pro-
gram, 28 J. URBAN AFFAIRS 443 (2006) ("With the exception of a few isolated incidences where individual 
zones fared better than comparison areas, zone initiatives had little impact."); Joel A. Elvery, The Impact of 
Enterprise Zones on Resident Employment, 23 ECON. DEV. Q. 44 (2009) ("The author finds no evidence that 
these enterprise zones affected the employment of zone residents."); Robert T. Greenbaum & Jim Landers, Why 
Are State Policy Makers Still Proponents of Enterprise Zones? What Explains Their Action in the Face of a 
Preponderance of the Research? 32 INT’L REG’L SCI. REV. 466 (2009) (“There is little evidence that they have 
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“could not tie these changes definitively to the empowerment zone designation” due 
to a general uptick in the economy as a whole during the period analyzed.66  More 
than simply being ineffectual, there is evidence to suggest that these programs may 
have actually been harmful to the economic well-being of the nation.  
First, according to one study, apparent modest increases in the economic well-
being of those inside the zones “may mask countervailing effects on different subsets 
of firms” and “[i]ncreases in employment, sales, and capital expenditures in new and 
existing establishments may be mostly offset by losses in employment, sales, and 
capital expenditures among firms that close or leave the zone.”67  For most “zone” 
programs, a limited number of available designations competes with demands to 
disperse those designations throughout the country without placing any one zone 
adjacent to another.68  While one census tract may be designated as a zone eligible 
for one of these programs, its neighbors that are similarly situated economically may 
not be granted the same designation.  When there is a legislatively established tax 
incentive to bring business into one zone rather than another, the choice of where an 
investor might place his or her business is likely affected.69  While the effect of this 
choice may initially appear to be a gain to the designated zone, it may, in fact, be a 
larger detriment to its neighbor that might have otherwise earned the opportunity for 
the business itself.70  There is even evidence to suggest that some businesses were 
prompted to move from one non-designated tract to its designated neighbor, thereby 
not only not causing a net economic gain for the community as a whole, but instead 
incurring transactional relocation costs that take revenue out of the community 
completely.71  
                                                          
succeeded.”); Stephanie Cumings, Governor Calls Enterprise Zones ‘A Failed 30-Year Experiment, TAX 
NOTES, Sep. 12, 2016, https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-notes/legislation-and-lawmaking/governor-calls-
enterprise-zones-failed-30-year-experiment/2016/09/12/bd7w (the then-Governor of New Jersey, Chris Chris-
tie, said in a statement after vetoing a renewal of an Enterprise Zone bill: "I am concerned that this bill simply 
continues a failed 30-year experiment with UEZs at significant costs for the State.”). 
66  Id. (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-727, EMPOWERMENT ZONE AND ENTER-
PRISE COMMUNITY PROGRAM: IMPROVEMENTS OCCURRED IN COMMUNITIES, BUT THE EFFECT OF THE PRO-
GRAM IS UNCLEAR, 4 (2006)); see also Jed Kolko & David Neumark, Do Some Enterprise Zones Create Jobs? 
29 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. (2010) ("Overall, the evidence indicates that enterprise zones do not increase 
employment."). 
67  JOINT COMM. TAXATION, JCX-38-09, supra note 65, at 23; but see Robert T. Greenbaum & John B. 
Engberg, The Impact of State Enterprise Zones on Urban Manufacturing Establishments, 23 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS 
& MGMT. 315 (2004) (“Zones did lead to new business activity inside the zones.  The number of [enterprise] 
births and employment, payroll, and shipments due to those births all increased significantly in the zones post-
designation."). 
68  See, e.g., Lamb, supra note 62.  The initial legislation limited the total number of renewal communities 
designable to forty. 
69  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-1009SP, supra note 41, at 35 (reviewing the con-
cept of economic efficiency as detailed above). 
70  See generally JOINT COMM. TAXATION, JCX-38-09, supra note 65. 
71  Id.; see also Andrew Hanson & Shawn Rohlin, Do Spatially Targeted Redevelopment Programs Spill 
Over? 43 REG’L SCI. & URBAN ECON. 86 (2013) ("Establishments can benefit by literally moving across the 
street into the EZ to enjoy the benefits of the program without incurring relocation costs associated with moving 
further from a customer base, employees, or losing other advantages of the immediate location . . . If the goal 
of policy makers is to induce relocation, it seems that even this modest objective may come at a cost of destroy-
ing jobs and establishments in areas that compete with targeted places."); Robin P. Malloy, The Political Econ-
omy of Co-Financing America’s Urban Renaissance, 40 VAND. L. REV. 67, 79 (1987) (“Ultimately, a continu-
ing question about enterprise zones is the extent to which they foster new investment and new job opportunities 
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Next, there is evidence to suggest that those who lived in the designated zones 
beforehand were negatively impacted by the implementation as well.72  In one study, 
rents increased in the zones by approximately 7%, but the wages earned remained 
stagnant.73  As a result, those who were already employed in the zones had to pay 
more in rent, while earning the same amount of money that they did before the 
creation of the zone.  Housing values increased by approximately 22%—significantly 
higher than the rent increased.74  Although this would help those in the zone that 
owned their home beforehand, it would also make buying less accessible to those 
who did not already own a home.  Another study found that: 
 
[a]mong the new establishments, the [Enterprise Zone] incentives are 
found to reduce payroll per employee, indicating the new jobs are low-
paying …  [Enterprise Zone] policies, finally, are found to significantly 
accelerate the loss of employment, sales, and capital expenditures 
accounted for by vanishing establishments, thus offsetting the gains to the 
other establishments and resulting in the finding of no zone impact 
common in other studies.75 
Finally, there are impacts from Enterprise Zones that extend beyond economics.  
These zones, and other like programs,76 can encourage businesses to relocate to 
places with less established public transportation and force sprawl.77  In addition to 
business relocation, if a large portion is redeveloped, it can force those living in the 
areas out of their homes and again require those that work in the zone to come from 
further distances to get to work.78 
Although these previous programs were similar to Opportunity Zones, they are 
not the same as Opportunity Zones themselves.  Many people still have hope that this 
new program will be able to benefit low-income communities in the way past 
programs have purported to do.79  There are three primary ways in which the 
Opportunity Zone program differs from these various examples of past programs.80  
First, Opportunity Zones are not limited to metropolitan areas.81  Many past iterations 
of similar programs have been definitionally constrained to high-density urban areas, 
while Opportunity Zones can be designated in any tract where the median income is 
                                                          
as opposed to merely shifting business from outside the zone to within the zone.”). 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  Daniele Bondonio & Robert T. Greenbaum, Do Local Tax Incentives Affect Economic Growth? What 
Mean Impacts Miss in the Analysis of Enterprise Zone Policies, 37 REG’L SCI. & URBAN ECON. 121 (2007). 
76  See generally Sarah Kogel-Smucker, Zoning Out: State Enterprise Zones’ Impact on Sprawl, Job 
Creation, and Environment, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 111 (2008). 
77  Id. 
78  Id.  
79  See Curry, supra note 8. (“[W]hile earlier opportunity zone iterations that are no longer in effect, like 
renewal communities or enterprise zones, were generally found to have disappointing results, opportunity zone 
proponents say this time will be different.”). 
80  Id. 
81  I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (Supp. V 2017). 
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80% or less than the median income statewide.82  This includes rural areas, small 
towns, and anything that fits that definition in between.83  Next, Opportunity Zones 
encourage investors with larger amounts of capital than most programs, such as 
“private equity firms, banks, venture capitalists, mutual funds, and hedge funds,” to 
invest to a much greater extent than past programs have.84  This, on its own, should 
not affect the end result to the low-income communities much, but it ties into the last 
difference between Opportunity Zones and many past programs: scalability, or the 
ability to reach a larger portion of the country.  Many past programs have provided 
upfront subsidies or tax credits of some sort for investing in these areas.85  In contrast, 
the Opportunity Zone program provides its benefits on the back end—via tax 
reductions—by deferring the capital gains tax and stepping-up the cost basis.86  This 
foregone revenue does not require any initial expenditure by the federal government 
and thus allows for this program to be taken advantage of without any cost limit on 
the scale.87  When paired with the way that the program is open to larger investors, 
this scalability allows for much larger amounts of capital to be placed into the low-
income communities than past programs have.88  
Even with these differences between many past programs and the current 
Opportunity Zone program, the end result will likely be the same for targeted low-
income communities.  These differences allow the program to be more widely 
available, but do not address many of the primary criticisms of this type of program 
generally.  This program has no protection against incentives of businesses to relocate 
from areas nearby—but outside a designated Opportunity Zones—into the 
Opportunity Zones solely for the Tax Credit.89  Regarding the economic status of 
those already within future Opportunity Zones, there is little evidence to suggest that 
their experience might differ from past programs as well.  There is little change in 
the overall principal in this aspect of the program; it is not addressed in any 
substantially different manner than any of the predecessors of Opportunity Zones.  
                                                          
82  See Curry, supra note 8. 
83  Id. 
84  JARED BERNSTEIN & KEVIN A. HASSETT, ECON. INNOVATION GRP., UNLOCKING PRIVATE CAPITAL 
TO FACILITATE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN DISTRESSED AREAS,17 (2015).  
85  Curry, supra note 8. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  Id.; see also BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 84 (“Our key observation is that existing and prior 
approaches have not harnessed the power of intermediaries such as private equity firms, banks, venture capital-
ists, mutual funds, and hedge funds. By focusing on often small individual businesses, policies have implicitly 
required an unrealistically large amount of coordination among potential investors, and hence, have failed.”).  
A focal point of the argument made by Bernstein and Hassett in their 2015 report was the need to allow an 
Opportunity Zone-like program to be more accessible to these “intermediaries.” Id.  In theory, it would allow 
for more capital to be placed into the communities by being both a larger source of that capital and requiring 
less coordination between parties to formulate larger-scale projects in targeted low-income communities.  A 
project of the size discussed here would often require government funding and action for redevelopment, but 
this type of program would allow private investors to act in the manner and at the scale of a government project.  
89  See generally I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (Supp. V 2017); I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (Supp. V 2017); Hanson & Rohlin, 
supra note 71, at 86 ("[E]stablishments can benefit by literally moving across the street into the EZ to enjoy the 
benefits of the program without incurring relocation costs associated with moving further from a customer base, 
employees, or losing other advantages of the immediate location . . . [I]f the goal of policy makers is to induce 
relocation, it seems that even this modest objective may come at a cost of destroying jobs and establishments 
in areas that compete with targeted places."). 
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Whether or not employers pass savings onto their employees by creating more jobs, 
raising wages, or some other means is completely up to the employer.90  History 
demonstrates employers do not typically pass down such savings to their 
employees.91  In addition, the effects on sprawl will likely not be affected much by 
this new program.  Although Opportunity Zones, unlike many previous iterations, do 
allow for these zones to be placed in rural areas, based upon sheer need and stated 
purpose, the majority will likely still be placed in urban communities.92  
Section 1400Z-1’s definition of “tract of land eligible” is an additional issue that 
could limit Opportunity Zones tangible benefits to communities.  Defined as a 
“Qualified Opportunity Zone,” it focuses only upon the income of the residents in a 
given tract of land.93  There is some understandable fear surrounding this lack of 
clarification for a number of reasons.94  First, there could be a tract that is 
economically stable with some profitable commercial properties and a small amount 
of low-income housing. 95  In addition, tracts adjacent to Qualified Opportunity Zones 
that have an income level above the threshold may be lumped into the program as 
long as their income level does not exceed 125% of the contiguous tract.96  Or the 
tract could be immediately adjacent to an already economically successful area that 
would receive a significant amount of the benefit.97  Because of this, there is 
considerable concern that low-income communities might not benefit much at all 
from the program.98 
Many scholars believe that the heart of the problem lies deeper than an incentive 
investors can solve.99  Many believe the root of the problem is a need for social—
rather than economic—change, especially one targeted in the manner that this 
program is.100  The evidence shows that programs similar to Opportunity Zones “fail 
to promote the social change necessary to support sustainable communities.”101 
                                                          
90  See generally I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (Supp. V 2017); I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (Supp. V 2017); Joel A. Elvery, The 
Impact of Enterprise Zones on Resident Employment, 23 ECON. DEV. Q. 44, 44 (2009) ("[T]he author finds no 
evidence that these enterprise zones affected the employment of zone residents."). 
91  Id. 
92  See Kennedy, supra note 6; see generally Sarah Kogel-Smucker, Zoning Out: State Enterprise Zones’ 
Impact on Sprawl, Job Creation, and Environment, 35 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 111 (2008).  
93  I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (Supp. V 2017). 
94  See Cedric L. Richmond, Congressional Black Caucus Raises Concerns with O-Zone Regs, TAX 
NOTES, Dec. 28, 2018, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/opportunity-zones/congressional-black-cau-
cus-raises-concerns-o-zone-regs/2019/01/09/291d9?highlight=opportunity%20zones%20basis (“[T]he Treas-
ury Department should draft rules that ensure that benefits flow to communities and residents, not just wealthy 
investors.”). 
95  Id. 
96  I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (Supp. V 2017). 
97  Richmond, supra note 94. (“Some of the already designated Opportunity Zones . . . about communities 
that are well off already or already receiving ample investment flows.”). 
98  Id. 
99  See generally Sagalow, supra note 50. 
100  Bruce Bartlett, Enterprise Zones: The Good, The Bad, and The Muddled, TAX NOTES (Jan. 21, 2014), 
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/incentives/enterprise-zones-good-bad-and-mud-
dled/2014/01/21/fb98. 
101  Jennifer Forbes, Using Economic Development Programs as Tools for Urban Revitalization: A Com-
parison of Empowerment Zones and New Markets Tax Credits, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 177, 197.  See also Rich-
mond, supra note 94 (As it stands, the Congressional Black Caucus states that “[t]he Treasury Department 
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If programs similar to Opportunity Zones have, in the past, failed to benefit the 
targeted communities and Opportunity Zones themselves seem like they will not be 
much different, the question becomes: “who does stand to benefit from Opportunity 
Zones?” 
 
II.THE SCALE OF THE BENEFITS TO INVESTORS UNDER § 1400Z 
 
The true beneficiaries of the implementation of Opportunity Zones are the 
investors that take advantage of the program.  Although it was touted as a program 
that would primarily benefit those who live in low-income communities,102 most of 
the economic benefit will be gained by investors instead.103  
By one estimate from the Joint Committee on Taxation, the Opportunity Zone 
program is expected to amount to an expenditure of $6.7 billion over the next five 
years.104  In the black letter of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, none of that expenditure 
goes directly to the targeted low-income communities.105  The full extent of the 
expenditure comes in the form of tax breaks to the investors.106  This is not to say 
that the program does not have a supposed benefit to the target communities, but it 
does not arise in a direct manner.107  The previous section explored what benefits 
were supposed to be gained by the private investment into communities labelled as 
Opportunity Zones.   
  The theory through which the benefit is supposed to materialize in the low-
income communities is “trickle-down” economics.108  The thought behind this theory 
in regard to an Opportunity Zone-like program contends that “[i]nvesting in 
downtown shopping centers, hotels, office buildings, and restaurants is supposed to 
create job opportunities for the unskilled and difficult to employ.”109  According to 
Malloy, the “problem with the trickle down assertion is that it ignores simple 
economic realities about job creation.  As long as money is not stuffed in a mattress, 
it will be employed in some capacity in the economy.  The result is that jobs will be 
created with that money.”110  In addition, there are strong arguments that the trickle-
                                                          
should take its responsibility seriously here and ensure that the public's interest in promoting sustainable eco-
nomic and community development is being met.”). 
102  See Kennedy, supra note 6. 
103  See generally Stephen M. Rosenthal, Opportunity Zones May Create More Opportunities for Inves-
tors and Syndicators than Distressed Communities, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Aug. 2, 2018) https://www.taxpoli-
cycenter.org/taxvox/opportunity-zones-may-create-more-opportunities-investors-and-syndicators-distressed. 
104  See Sagalow, supra note 50. 
105  See generally Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2044 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
106  See generally 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-2 (Supp. V 2017). 
107  Id. 
108 See Malloy, supra note 71, at 123-24; Tejvan Pettinger, Trickle Down Economics, ECON. HELP (Nov. 
9, 2017), https://www.economicshelp.org/blog/174/economics/trickle-down-economics/ (“[t]rickle down eco-
nomics is a term used to describe the belief that if high-income earners gain an increase in salary, then everyone 
in the economy will benefit as their increased income and wealth filter through to all sections in society.”).  
109  Malloy, supra note 71, at 123.  
110  Id. at 124.  Malloy continues:  
For instance, a city's using one million dollars in tax revenues to subsidize a business that employs a 
number of people only means that the one million dollars that would have been available for individuals to 
invest in the marketplace has been invested for them by the city. Individuals in possession of the money would 
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down theory does not actually “trickle”.111  In many cases, the beneficiaries of tax 
expenditures end up holding the wealth themselves instead of passing it along in the 
form of more jobs, higher wages, or even expenditures of their own.112  
As Malloy said, “[a]s long as money is not stuffed in a mattress, it will be 
employed in some capacity in the economy.”113  But there is nothing in the 
Opportunity Zone provision that would require—or even strongly encourage—the 
beneficiaries of an Opportunity Zone to place that money back into the community 
from which the tax benefit was gained.114  Opportunity Zones cannot be taken 
advantage of by individual investors looking to better their community;115 instead 
only entities, Funds, can invest through the program.116  The fact that only entities 
can invest in the Opportunity Zones creates a barrier to smaller investors, and, as a 
result, the majority of Funds will likely be created by the extremely wealthy, with 
interests far wider than the community affected by the program.  A Fund can invest 
in an Opportunity Zone in Jackson, Mississippi and take the tax savings from the 
project and instead use it to improve the Fund owner’s corporate office in Santa Clara, 
California.  Or, in an even less beneficial outcome to the economy of the community, 
it could simply hold it in their tax haven in Venezuela.117  As a result, “[t]he evidence 
that … a supply-side tax cut to the top income level will grow the economy, is no 
stronger than the evidence for an enterprise zone.”118 
 Whether an investor has the community in mind or is truly self-interested, there 
is a large incentive to take advantage of the Opportunity Zone program.  Although 
the benefits to the targeted communities are more ethereal and theoretical, the 
benefits to the investors are concrete and substantial.119  
 First, placing money into a Fund and investing in an Opportunity Zone allows 
for a deferment of any capital gains income tax that may be due on the property 
sold.120  When investors sell property that is eligible for treatment as a capital gain 
                                                          
have purchased more goods and services than they otherwise were able to and thereby would have increased 
job opportunities in the activities most valued by community members. Thus, the one million dollars is still 
only one million dollars no matter who is spending it, and the jobs created by one project merely mean the loss 
of potential jobs elsewhere.  
Id. at 124-25.  
111  John Kenneth Galbraith, Recession Economics, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS (Feb. 4, 1982) (recalling the 
nineteenth-century “horse-and-sparrow” theory, a predecessor of trickle-down economics: “[i]f you feed the 
horse enough oats, some will pass through to the road for the sparrows.”); see also David Weigel, It’s the One 
Thing Rand Paul and Barack Obama Agree On, and It Doesn’t Work, SLATE (Jan. 10, 2014), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2014/01/enterprise-zones-the-one-thing-rand-paul-and-barack-obama-
agree-on-and-it-doesn-t-work.html. 
112  See Heather Stewart, Wealth Doesn’t Trickle Down—It Just Floods Offshore, Research Reveals, 
GUARDIAN (Jul. 21, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/jul/21/offshore-wealth-global-econ-
omy-tax-havens.  
113  Malloy, supra note 71, at 124. 
114  See I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (Supp. V 2017). 
115  Id.  
116  See BERNSTEIN & HASSETT, supra note 84, at 1, 17 (urging the any new program—the eventual 
Opportunity Zone program—to utilize intermediaries as investors instead of individuals).  
117  See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 112.  
118  Weigel, supra note 111. 
119  See Kennedy, supra note 6. 
120  I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (Supp. V 2017).  
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and reinvest it into an Opportunity Zone, the capital gains income tax can be deferred 
in the same way a § 1031 Exchange can.121  The primary difference between the 
income tax deferment in a § 1031 Exchange and the Opportunity Zone program, is 
that a § 1031 Exchange is required to be a like-kind exchange; most often, capital 
from the sale of a real estate investment property repurposed into the purchase of a 
new real estate investment property.122  An investment in an Opportunity Zone, on 
the other hand, does not have to be a like-kind exchange.123  Instead, any property 
eligible for treatment for capital gains—whether it is a piece of real estate investment 
property, stocks or other securities interests, or any other type of capital gains 
property—may be rolled over into a Fund and deferred.124  The deferment for an 
Opportunity Zone lasts until the earlier of the end of 2026 or the date the Opportunity 
Zone property is eventually sold.125  Although the income tax for capital gains will 
eventually be paid by the investor, the time value of money results in greater value 
on their income than would have otherwise been possible without deferment.126  
Although the deferment of tax allows capital to be utilized more freely, a much larger 
benefit of the program is the option to pay no tax on income from a particular 
transaction.127  
 In addition to deferment, the Opportunity Zone program also offers the 
avoidance of some taxes altogether.  For tax purposes, income from the sale of 
property is calculated by finding the difference between the amount realized by the 
taxpayer in the final sale of the property and the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the 
property.128  A property’s basis is effectively the purchase price with certain statutory 
adjustments in the Internal Revenue Code such as depreciation.129   
Opportunity Zones offer one such adjustment to the basis of a property.130  After 
a Fund holds a property for five years, the basis of that property is adjusted up by 
10%, thus exempting the fund from all taxation on that extra 10% of the purchase 
price.131  After an additional two years, that basis is raised another 5%, totaling an 
exemption of 15% of the original purchase price.132  
 The most significant benefit for investors in the Opportunity Zone program 
                                                          
121  I.R.C. § 1031 (2012 & Supp. V 2017); see also I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (Supp. V 2017). 
122  See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES UNDER IRC CODE SECTION 1031 (2008), 
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/like-kind-exchanges-under-irc-code-section-1031 (explaining the requirements 
of a like-kind exchange for the purposes of a tax deferment). 
123  I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (Supp. V 2017). 
124  See Kennedy, supra note 6.  
125  I.R.C. § 1031 (2012 & Supp. V 2017). 
126 Glossary of Terms, NEW BRANCH REAL ESTATE ADVISORS, http://www.newbranchre.com/Mar-
ket/Glossary-of-Terms (last visited Apr. 14, 2019)(defining the time value of money as “[a]n economic principle 
recognizing that a dollar today has greater value than a dollar in the future because of its earning power.”); see 
also Time Value of Money, INVESTOPEDIA, (last visited Apr. 14, 2019) (“[M]oney available now is worth more 
than the same amount in the future because of its potential earning capacity.”). 
127  See generally LYSANDER SPOONER, NO TREASON: THE CONSTITUTION OF NO AUTHORITY (1870). 
128  I.R.C. § 1001 (Supp. V 2017). 
129  FREELAND ET AL., supra note 16, at 115.  
130  I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2018). 
131  Id. 
132  Id. 
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arises when a Fund has held a piece of property for ten years or more.133  If a property 
held by a Fund in an Opportunity Zone is eventually sold, the basis for the property 
is fully stepped-up to the fair market value of the property on the day it is sold, all 
but eliminating taxable income realized in the transaction.134  As a hypothetical 
example, if an abandoned warehouse in an Opportunity Zone was purchased by an 
investor through a Fund for $500,000 in 2019, then redeveloped into a new, multi-
use building at a cost of $3,000,000, and sold in 2030 for its fair market value of 
$8,000,000, no income would be recognized in the sale at all.  The investor would 
avoid taxation on $4,500,000 of income that any other person not able to take 
advantage of the Opportunity Zone program would have to pay. 
 There is an immense separation between the benefits gained by the investors of 
Opportunity Zones through the program and those gained by the targeted 
communities.  As discussed in the previous section of this Note, the benefits to the 
communities are minute, if present at all.135  Yet, as discussed in this section, there is 
potential for huge benefits in the form of tax breaks for investors.136  This disconnect 
has been prevalent historically throughout programs similar to Opportunity Zones as 
well.137   
 Now that the benefits for the investors have reached an elevated level, this 
disconnect has the potential to be even greater for the Opportunity Zone program.138  
As tax policy expert, Stephen M. Rosenthal, stated, “[t]he fundamental problem with 
Opportunity Zones is the disconnect between the size of the potential tax costs, which 
are uncapped, and the social benefits from the investments, which will be hard to 
measure.”139  The disconnect between the size of the benefits to investors and the 
lack of benefits to the community also indicates a disconnect between the benefit to 
the communities and the tax costs to the country.140  Every dollar that is saved by the 
investors due to the tax breaks in the Opportunity Zone program is a dollar of tax 
expenditures and foregone revenue by the federal government.  
 Returning to the purposes of an effective Federal Income Tax, this disconnect 
between investor gain and community benefit goes against the tax policy goal of 
vertical equity.141  In the United States, the progressive tax system attempts to allocate 
the tax burden relatively equitably by ability to pay;142 those with higher levels of 
                                                          
133  See Merrill Hoopengardener & Forrest David Milder, Historic Tax Credit Group Seeks Clarity Under 
O-Zone Regs, TAX NOTES, Dec. 28, 2018, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/opportunity-zones/his-
toric-tax-credit-group-seeks-clarity-under-o-zone-regs/2019/01/09/291db?highlight=oppor-
tunity%20zones%20basis (discussing the magnitude of potential issues from the ten-year step-up in basis). 
134  I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2018). 
135  See generally Sagalow, supra note 50. 
136  See generally Kennedy, supra note 6. 
137  See, e.g., Aprill, supra, note 64, at 1347 (“On average in 1987, for each dollar of employee compen-
sation, these pharmaceutical companies received $2.67 in tax benefits.”  The pharmaceutical companies that 
benefitted from this particular Opportunity Zone-like provision turned less than 40% of its gain into employee 
wages.). 
138  Rosenthal, supra note 103; see also Sagalow, supra note 50 (“[T]he incentives for investments are 
more generous than those for investments under previous programs.”). 
139  Id. 
140  Id.  
141  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-1009SP, supra note 41, at 24. 
142  Id. 
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income are subject to a higher tax rate than those with lower levels of income.143  
However, the Opportunity Zone program goes against this established principle.  The 
tax benefits available through the program are only available to the wealthiest of 
people in the country.144  These substantial tax breaks will significantly reduce their 
effective tax rates, while those living in the targeted communities will still be subject 
to the same rates as before.  This is counter to the concept of vertical equity as it 
brings the country closer to a flat tax rate.145 
 The Opportunity Zone program conflicts with the tax policy goal of horizontal 
equity as well.146  Horizontal equity is the principal “that taxpayers who have similar 
ability to pay taxes receive similar tax treatment.”147  A Fund—which must be a legal 
entity and not an individual taxpayer—must be used to invest in an Opportunity 
Zone.148  As a hypothetical, two taxpayers—one a corporation, and one an 
individual—each have identical gross income, purchase identical properties next 
door to one another, and redevelop them into identical new buildings.  Because of the 
Opportunity Zone program, they could have vastly different levels of adjusted gross 
income—and, therefore, tax liability—at the end of the year just because of the fact 
that one is a legal entity and the other is not. 
 In its attempt to help low-income communities as advertised, the program falls 
short, revealing that the true beneficiaries of the Opportunity Zone program are the 
investors.  Moreover, the uncertainty regarding the interpretation and procedure 
surrounding § 1400Z only further adds to the legislation’s shortcomings. 
 
III.PROBLEMS WITH IMPLEMENTATION OF § 1400Z 
 
From the moment the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 was passed, the Opportunity 
Zone program outlined in § 1400Z faced immediate implementation issues.  The 
House version of the bill did not contain the provision at all,149 and the Senate hur-
riedly pushed the rest of the bill through without much opportunity for debate.150  As 
a result, very little review of the Opportunity Zone provision occurred.  The resulting 
jumbled Code section reflects this sparse discourse. 
The Code provision has already been the subject of a number of requests for 
clarification, interpretation issues, and revenue rulings.  In fact, the Joint Committee 
on Taxation stated that “[a] technical correction may be needed to reflect … intent” 
in regard to a portion of the Opportunity Zone legislation.151  In the meantime, the 
                                                          
143  I.R.C. § 1 (2018). 
144  See Sagalow, supra note 50. 
145  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-1009SP, supra note 41, at 28. 
146  Id. at 27.  
147  Id. 
148  I.R.C. § 1400Z-2 (2018). 
149  See JOINT COMM. TAXATION, JCX-65-17, supra note 43. 
150  Andrew Schwartz & Galen Hendricks, One Year Later, the TCJA Fails to Live Up to Its Proponents’ 
Promises, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/re-
ports/2018/12/20/464534/one-year-later-tcja-fails-live-proponents-promises/ (“[T]he hurried and partisan pro-
cess of the bill’s passage resulted in several new and continued loopholes.”). 
151  JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCT-1-18, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC LAW 115-97,, 317 
n.1478 (2018). 
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Internal Revenue Service has devoted significant resources in an attempt to clarify 
how it will view significant portions of the provision.  For example, REG-115420-
18 attempts to clarify what types of income are eligible for tax deferment,152 and 
Revenue Ruling 2018-29 attempts to clarify what sort of uses qualify as “substan-
tially improved” uses in order to determine whether a property is eligible for benefi-
cial tax treatment.153  However, even after these much-requested clarifications, some 
are still calling for more.154  According to John Lettieri of the Economic Innovation 
Group, “[i]nvestors have yet to receive the formal guidance or regulatory clarity 
needed to inform their decision-making” in regard to Opportunity Zones, even going 
as far as to say that the success of the program relies on clarification and Treasury 
rules.155  
In cases where clarifications were provided, they were sometimes too late to 
counteract one of the prevailing issues with the legislation: namely, the ninety-day 
window for Qualified Opportunity Zone designation.156  In the Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act, Congress delegated the power of designating Qualified Opportunity Zones to 
the chief executives of the states subject to the guidelines in § 1400Z-1.157  In doing 
so, Congress laid out an appreciably vague set of standards as to what was eligible 
for designation by the governors.158  The only significant requirement was that the 
tract qualifies as a “low-income community.”159  That is, a population census tract 
where the poverty rate of the tract is 20% or the median family income for the tract 
is 80% or less of either the median family income of the metropolitan area or the 
median family income of the state as a whole.160  
This vagueness can be abused in a number of ways: (a) tracts can be in econom-
ically viable areas already with a small amount of housing that is disproportionately 
low-income;161 (b) tracts can be immediately adjacent to an already economically 
strong tract;162 or (c) a tract can be within an economically strong metropolitan area 
and simply below the median income in that area.163  In response to these open doors 
for abuse, the Congressional Black Caucus urged that “the Treasury Department 
should draft rules that ensure that benefits flow to communities and residents, not just 
wealthy investors.”164  However, new rules would likely not remedy any of these 
                                                          
152  See Treas. Reg. § 115420-18 (2018). 
153  See Rev. Rul. 18-29 (2018). 
154  See, e.g., Novogradac & Company LLP, Lack of O-Zone Guidance Deterring Investments, Firm 
Says, TAX NOTES, Nov. 26, 2018, https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/deferral-taxes/lack-o-zone-guid-
ance-deterring-investments-firm-says/2018/12/07/28np6.  
155  Stephen K. Cooper, Success of Opportunity Zones Tied to Treasury Rules, TAX NOTES, Oct. 4 2018, 
https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today/dividends/success-opportunity-zones-tied-treasury-
rules/2018/10/04/28h52.  
156  I.R.C. § 1400Z-1 (2018). 
157  Id.  
158  See id. 
159  I.R.C. § 45D(e) (2018). In 26 U.S.C. § 1400Z-1(c)(1), “low-income community” is described as 
having the same definition as in I.R.C. § 45D(e). 
160  Id. 
161  See Richmond, supra note 94. 
162  Id. 
163  I.R.C. § 45D. 
164  Richmond, supra note 94. 
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issues due to the ninety-day window for designation of Opportunity Zones.  States 
had until only ninety days after the passing of the bill to designate Opportunity Zones.  
This deadline ran on March 21, 2018.165  After a few statutorily eligible extensions, 
the final deadline for designation was June 18, 2018.166  As a result, every Oppor-
tunity Zone that will be created is already in existence, and further regulation in this 
area would not accomplish anything. 
Although no one of these potential concerns with the interpretation and imple-
mentation is likely to become a fatal flaw in § 1400Z, together they paint a picture of 
a less than fully-formed piece of legislation.  One of the primary goals of an effective 
tax program is a combination of simplicity, transparency, and administrability.167  
The interpretation issues that need to be addressed in the Opportunity Zone program 
significantly hinder these concepts.168  Paired with the lack of effectiveness in the 
program’s stated goals and the inequities it created, the picture becomes even more 
muddled. 
 
IV.CONCLUSION 
 
 The deadline for designation of Opportunity Zones by state executives has since 
passed169 and roughly 8,700 Opportunity Zones were certified by the Treasury De-
partment,170 amounting to 12% of United States census tracts.171  This program has 
already laid the foundation for a major impact on the United States economy and tax 
system and investors have begun to formulate plans on how to take advantage of the 
opportunity it provides.  Estimates on tax expenditures by the federal government for 
the program are significant,172 and many believe they are drastically understated.173  
 As discussed throughout this Note, the goals of a tax code should be to raise 
revenue while maintaining “equity; economic efficiency; and a combination of sim-
plicity, transparency, and administrability.”174  The Opportunity Zones program is 
far-reaching, and it fails to achieve the goals of a portion of the tax code.  The pro-
gram is horizontally inequitable by favoring certain types of investors and vertically 
inequitable by benefitting the wealthy to the detriment of—or at least no benefit to—
                                                          
165  Adam S. Wallwork & Linda B. Schakel, Primer on Qualified Opportunity Zones, TAX NOTES, May 
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the low-income communities targeted by the program.  The program is inefficient in 
that it encourages investments in different areas over others that may be similarly 
situated and viable, and in that it encourages investments be made through legal en-
tities—not by individuals.  The program is not simple, transparent, nor administrable 
because it further convolutes the tax code, leaves large portions up to the discretion 
of state executives, and there have been—and continue to be—numerous calls for 
clarification.  All the while, Opportunity Zones are projected to cost taxpayers bil-
lions of dollars.175 
 Whether the overall Opportunity Zone program was not fully thought out, 
simply implemented poorly, or constructed deliberately to benefit the wealthy, it is 
not effective tax policy as a whole.  Although they might not have had the chance to 
redevelop, many investors have already begun exchanging for Opportunity Zone-el-
igible property in reliance on the statute.176  However, the major problem with this 
program is the lack of actual help provided to the communities.  Many believe that 
programs in the past have “fail[ed] to promote the social change necessary to support 
sustainable communities,”177 and that that is their major shortcoming.  Instead of pro-
moting generic, blanket economic growth, programs that target actual social change 
through tangible benefits like money for schools, day cares, parks, community cen-
ters, etc., might accomplish more good in the very communities that the Opportunity 
Zone program purportedly seeks to help. 
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